I. INTRODUCTION 1
The liability of Internet intermediaries has been a key question in information technology law for nearly two decades. 2 There is a well-understood difference in how this issue is treated in US and European Union law. 3 Federal law in the US distinguishes between liability for intellectual property infringements on one hand and a range of other civil actions on the other. This is because section 230
Communications Decency Act (1996) provides a general exclusion from liability, i.e.
that intermediaries are not to be treated as a 'publisher or speaker' in respect of information provided by others. Taking a different approach, section 512 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) establishes, in respect of some intermediaries, a conditional scheme (including what is often termed 'notice and takedown' or NTD) in the field of copyright. This scheme increases the legal risk to the intermediary, requiring as it does specific procedures to be put in place and actions taken. 4 The result is that, in practice, US intermediaries must pay more attention to allegations of copyright infringement than to allegations of defamation.
The argument advanced in this article is that, despite the existence of different cross- clear fashion than is the case in the United States. This phenomenon will be explained by reference to defamation, privacy, and copyright. It will also be shown how the interaction between domestic and EU law and between statute and common laws affect the position of intermediaries, again indicating a difference with the simpler US approach. The intention is not to make a normative claim about intermediary liability, but to present a critical perspective on how different liability regimes have come into being.
A distinction will be made between four types of intermediary, based on the lines drawn in the ECD (all of which are 'information society service providers' (ISSPs) as defined in and in relation to the ECD -although not every ISSP is necessarily an intermediary). The law as it stands has different expectations of these categories, and they carry out different technical functions too. Political statements regarding 'ISPs' without further distinction often serve to confuse rather than illustrate; the problem also affects the interpretation of prior decisions.
The first type is a mere conduit, i.e. one which provides access to the Internet (often what is meant in business by the term ISPs), such as Virgin Media or TalkTalk. The second is a cache, i.e. temporary storage (which will not be considered in any detail here as few if any novel or distinctive issues are raised). Third is the class of 'hosts', such as YouTube or Twitter. Finally, there is the category of search engines, whichin so far as implemented in the UK -is not covered by the immunity provisions of the ECD. (In some member states, search engines are so protected).
The position of conduits, hosts and search engines will now be considered, followed by a concluding section which summarises the position of each in respect of the three areas of law within the scope of this article.
II. CONDUITS

A. Overview
The main provision for mere conduits is Article 12 ECD, which offers generous immunity from liability; defamation cases (e.g. A further power for a 'blocking injunction in respect of a location on the internet' is provided for in s 17 DEA, although this power would only be available if further secondary legislation were adopted. This is not based on actual knowledge but does apply to the same category of entities ('service providers') as defined in s 97A CDPA.
It came to be in the final version of the Act after the withdrawal of a more extensive power to grant blocking injunctions. The explanation was that it would form a part of the strategy to tackle copyright infringement, by addressing Web-based infringement as opposed to the peer-to-peer form of infringement, which would be tackled through the graduated response system (discussed below services. In such a case, all downloaders are essentially also uploaders; the latter is easier to detect and indeed to define as infringement. Subsequently, if activated (no earlier than a year after the initial code comes into force), a further provision will require ISPs to take action against customers who are repeat infringers, through what are termed 'technical measures' (e.g. slowing down of connection speed).
E. Conclusion
All of these obligations are presented in a careful way so as to avoid suggesting that the high mark of immunity under article 12 ECD has not been compromised. adoption of section 17 DEA. 27 While a single one of these points might be explained in other ways, assembling them demonstrates that the general approach to intermediary liability is considered appropriate in the case of some legal wrongs, but insufficient in the case of others. In that context, it is not surprising to see arguments emerging that the effect of section 97A CDPA could be extended to other fields, not through the section itself (which is clearly limited to copyright) but through developing a common law version thereof, within the scope of section 37 Senior
Courts Act 1981 (power of High Court to grant injunctions where just and convenient to do so).
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The backdrop to all of these developments is the ongoing considerations of injunctions and the ECD by the Court of Justice, although so far, the English courts have not gone much further than noting the jurisprudence. The cases do express important principles on proportionality and on problems with requirements to filter.
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The test for granting a Norwich Pharmacal order has itself been clarified 30 All of this activity reveals something important about the purposes of regulating online activity in accordance with law (which could prompt a long discussion on lobbying, influence and legislative priorities, and strategic litigation), and demonstrates to critics of the current approach to liability how claims for reform can be articulated in respect of other wrongs. The next section will establish how liability itself can be seen, through a close reading, to be a site of debate regarding the harm caused by different types of online behaviour, in the case of hosts.
III. HOSTS
A. A notice-based approach
The ECD establishes in article 14 a scheme informally known as 'notice and takedown' or 'notice and action'. Despite the similar name, it is far less detailed than the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 'notice and takedown' system for copyright in the US. For example, the ECD test for immunity (that a host is safe unless it has 'actual knowledge of illegal activity or information' or is 'aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent') and requirement for immunity (obligation to 'act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information') does not govern the form or validity of notice. UK law adds a little more detail, directing courts to have regard to factors like the inclusion of name and address and details of the unlawful nature of the information or activity in a notice; 37 there is also a potentially significant change of wording in transposition, from 'is apparent' to 'would have been apparent'. and whether the requirement to act 'expeditiously' could be replaced by a specified time period (question 19).
A further theme is whether a single approach to notice and takedown is the best one.
The UK already goes beyond the ECD in setting out the details of how notice and takedown works in the special case of sections 3-4 Terrorism Act 2006, and the Commission reports a wide range of other practices across the EU. 41 In the case of defamation, there are similar (although not identical) provisions for a defence of innocent dissemination under the Defamation Act 1996.
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There is however a fundamental difficulty with a notice-based approach to intermediary liability which continues to provoke debate. 43 This is the inescapable bias in favour of action on the part of the host, which is explained here in the style of Pascal's Wager (on the logic of belief in God). • Harm to host (liability)
• Neutral to reader
• Neutral to complainant
• Neutral to author
• Minor harm to host (opportunity cost of defending)
• Benefit to reader (access to legal content)
Take Down
• Benefit to complainant
• Neutral to host (immunity)
• Neutral to complainant, or (undeserved) minor benefit from suppression of critical speech despite legality)
• Harm to author (suppression of legal speech, probably with no remedy against complainant or host)
• Neutral or minor harm to host As the host is the party being asked to take action, we focus first on its choice, and then assess the consequences for other parties. It can so be seen that the 'leave up' option means that the outcome for the host will be either harm or minor harm, while the 'take down' option delivers the option of no harm or 'no to minor' harm. As such, without further information, the host should choose 'take down'. However, where the content is legal, there is a marked difference between the 'leave up' (no harm to complainant or author and benefit to reader) and 'take down' (no harm to complainant, harm to author and reader) approaches, meaning that the optimal approach for the host is suboptimal for both the author and reader. Assuming that leaving up legal content affecting a complainant is not (legally) harmful, the complainant's position is not affected by the choice of path unless the content is unlawful. Therefore, the system produces the result that the host's action will benefit or not affect the complainant, but harm or not affect the author or reader. The interests of the complainant are therefore favoured. Furthermore, adjusting the standard for what is 'unlawful' -as discussed below -will be a significant step. This is because it increases the class of situations where lawful content is taken down.
With this problem in mind, we can turn to three ways in which the balance may be shifted, all relating to defamation law. 
B. The definition of notice
D. Reform of the law of defamation
The lengthy debate leading up to the Defamation Act 2013 has seen a proliferation of than English law has ever been: 'it is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who posted the statement on the website'.
However, s 5(3) plots a middle way between blanket immunity and the approach of the ECD, through enabling the defence to be defeated if the author is unidentifiable, a notice of complaint was given to the operator, and there was a failure to respond in accordance with regulations. As such, the (future) regulations need to be considered. . proposed legislation. After a late amendment, though, malice on the part of the website operator now defeats the defence.
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The Act resembles (but is less favourable towards the service provider than) the simple 'notice and notice' system used for copyright in Canada, 63 where there is a requirement on a host to pass on the notice to the user, with no liability or requirement for further action.
(Surprisingly, the pre-Bill paper from the Government 64 did not take the opportunity to discuss this precedent). The Act requires table 1 to be revisited, as set out below. • Neutral to host (immunity)
• Minor harm to author (opportunity cost of defending)
• Neutral to host
Take down (no ID)
[As table 1, above]
• Neutral to reader [As table 1, above]
• Neutral or minor harm to host (possible dispute with author, but terms and conditions likely to prevent legal action, so limited to possible loss of business)
• Harm to reader (denied access to legal content) If the content is unlawful and identified, the outcome is the removal of the complainant's remedy against the host, and shifts from minor harm to harm for the author (legal action by the complainant becomes easier) and from harm to neutral for the host. If the content is lawful and identified, the host's minor harm is replaced by a neutral outcome, but the author experiences minor harm through being forced to defend. If the content is unidentified, the analysis is unchanged. The host is the major 'winner' if the content is identified (although there is some shift of labour towards the author and also a limited remedy for the complainant), so it now has an incentive to choose the 'leave up' option. This is very close to the situation in the US for 
E. Defamation as a special case
Much of the material discussed in this section relates specifically to defamation. The first issue, regarding notice, is an interpretation of the ECD, but because of the discussion of the relevance of defences, some work would be necessary if it were desired that the same end (i.e. shifting the burden towards the person making the allegation and sending the notice) be achieved for all areas of liability. More problematic, in terms of an horizontal approach, are the remaining issues. The concept of publication is specific to the law of defamation (and perhaps privacy), and the common law on this point is self-contained. Indeed, as discussed below in the context of search engines, copyright law encompasses other, different concepts such as making available and authorization. Finally, the development of entirely novel notice and takedown schemes, including the placing of substantial weight on whether an author is identifiable is taking place within a defamation statute which could not, without further parliamentary intervention, affect liability in other areas.
The result of the three developments would therefore be likely to create a system for defamation that is favourable to the interests of the host (and, as set out in table 2, the reader), while preserving a system for other areas of liability which is much more favourable towards complainants. Considering Howarth's discussion of libel reform, where he notes that the consequences of change is to shift risk towards the victims of content (i.e. away from publishers) and increase the expectations placed upon judges, 66 it is difficult to conclude that due consideration has been given to this matter, or to explain why harm to reputation is so much less serious than harm to intellectual property rightsholders.
Furthermore, the host will also need to be aware of matters outside of liability. We have already noted the SABAM decision in the context of article 12 ECD. However, in the case of hosts, there is a further, more relevant decision to consider: SABAM v Netlog, where non-liability requirements on hosts were considered by the Court of Justice. 67 Although both cases had a similar interpretation of the relevant Directives, and use similar language, the second decision does serve to remind us that while section 97A CDPA cases in England to date have involved conduits, the section (and the underlying Information Society Directive) is applicable in the case of all service providers. 68 An entity need not be a conduit or indeed any kind of intermediary (for the purposes of articles 12-15 ECD) to be a service provider. As such, while the exact treatment of such an application against a social networking or video sharing site (or indeed a search engine, as noted below) awaits elaboration, this copyright-specific remedy only strengthens the conclusion that hosts are in very different positions when it comes to defamation and copyright. Member states were not required to apply the ECD to search engines. The divergent treatment of search engines was an issue in the Commission's review of it. 69 As the UK has not done so, the argument here has turned on the common-law publication question. In Metropolitan Schools v Designtechnica, 70 Google (as a search engine) was held not to be a publisher. In the highest level treatment of the matter to date, the Supreme Court of Canada found that in general, a hyperlink without more does not constitute publication for the purposes of defamation law. 71 Taking the two points together, and considering the matter from the point of view of the search engine operator, the common law is serving it well. However, this is not necessarily the case in all common law jurisdictions; there is a suggestion (not developed because the court reached its decision for other reasons) of some doubt regarding Metropolitan in a New Zealand decision of 2012, 72 and both criticism of the finding and rejection of the relevance in an Australian case (at the Victoria Supreme Court) of the same year. 
IV. SEARCH ENGINES
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These developments could be confined to copyright law, given that they turn on the interpretation of copyright statutes on copyright concepts. Taken in conjunction with the recommendation of the parliamentary committee on privacy and injunctions for new (statutory?) obligations on search engines to block unlawful material, 78 however, the shifts in liability may be a basis for renewed pressure from those favouring the interests of claimants to regulate search engine liability rather than exclude it in its entirety. Although the approach under defamation law has been criticised as favouring speech over reputation and taking a blanket approach to a complex problem, 79 this is demonstrably consistent with the debate regarding hosts, in that the impact of defamation law on online expression is being steadily minimised.
There are at least five questions to consider regarding the future regulation of search engines, as set out in Table 3 . given that a search engine is still an ISSP, albeit not within the immunity schemes? 82 There is no obvious textual reason why not, but again, the actual use of these powers would affect the tolerance of search engine providers of the current lacuna regarding liability.
(e) Does Article 10 ECHR restrict blocking, filtering or takedown requirements? The indications from international human rights bodies are that restrictions on Internet access are suspect, 83 and the Court of Justice (and legislative debate within the European Union) notes the importance of freedom of expression and of access to information. The Electronic Commerce Directive itself recognises the problem. 84 There is also a long (underdeveloped) tradition of considering the regulation of technology as a relevant factor on the part of the European Court of Human Rights. 85 Most recently, it has found a violation of article 10 in the case of a court order blocking users from accessing material hosted by a hosting service (Google Sites) because of illegal content on one site hosted there.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is now possible to compare the position of the intermediary across the areas of law and types of intermediary, as follows.
Defamation Privacy Copyright
Mere 
Table 3. Summary of differing obligations of intermediaries
Intermediaries are thus already being asked to do more in the case of copyright as compared with defamation, and the current position is one pointing towards further divergence, with caselaw and proposed legislation reducing the obligations of intermediaries regarding defamation, but their obligations regarding copyright becoming more onerous, even in the case of mere conduits. The position of privacy is close to that of defamation but with some 'missing pieces', alongside proposals to take a different approach being considered. But is this, as it should be, the result of due consideration of the relative merits of intellectual property, reputation and privacy rights, each set against the threat to freedom of expression posed by poorly calibrated notice and takedown schemes? Or, as it seems, a series of piecemeal changes which produce a system that overprotects some interests and underprotects others? The next steps in the review of the ECD do present an opportunity to 'fix' some of the problems, but restraint on the part of national lawmakers in applying 'quick fixes' is also necessary. The inconclusive outcome of the Tamiz appeal surely heightens the clamour for a more considered, coherent take on intermediary liability to be at the heart of the next legislative response.
